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This paper examines the demand for currency and quasi-money in Indonesia with linear and neural network models. The
goal is to predict better the recent financial distress, reflected by the flight into currency and decline of quasi-money.
The results show that neural network approaches, much more than linear models, are capable of  accurate out-of-sample
predictions for both monetary aggregates. However, for the very turbulent period of November and December of 1997, even the
neural network models show large out-of-sample forecast errors.
When a proxy for exchange-rate uncertainty supplements the network models, the out-of-sample currency demand becomes
quite accurate, even for the last month of 1997. The quasi-money demand forecast also improve, although not as dramatically as those
of currency demand.
The analysis shows that a credible program, which reduces uncertainty in exchange-rate expectations, may mitigate the
flight into currency from broad money, and the ensuing demonetization of the financial sector.
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I.   Introduction
I n this paper I examine the monthly demand for currency and quasi money inIndonesia, from 1984 through 1997.
This is an empirical exercise with immediate policy implications. Since the later part of
1997, the increase in currency demand has come at the expense of broad money. It thus
represents a demonetization of the banking sector, or a reversal of the process of “financial
deepening” in Indonesia. It is a clear sign of financial distress. If such a  process continues, it
cannot help but undermine the long term growth process of Indonesia.1
The flight from quasi money into currency was sudden, which traditional linear or
error-correction models did not forecast very well. For this reason, I make use of neural
networks, and contrast the results given by this approach with those given by linear models,
for in sample and out of sample accuracy.
It turns out that most important variable for explaining the sudden switch from quasi
money to currency in the out of sample forecast is exchange-rate uncertainty. Several proxy
variables for this uncertainty measure significantly improve the neural-network out of sample
forecasts.
The policy implication of this paper is that the monetary authority of Indonesia will
have take credible and quick steps to reduce exchange-rate uncertainty and volatility, if it
wishes to reserve the continuing demonetization process of the banking sector.
A related benefit is that this method may be an effective early warning system for financial
distress. If the forecasts of shifts in currency demand are in tandem with forecast a fall in quasi
money, the central bank may be able to anticipate this demonetization with appropriate policies
for restoring confidence in the financial sector.
The use of neural networks represents a departure from the purely linear rational
expectations approach to macroeconomics, into “bounded rationality”, in which economics
agents “learn” and respond to changes in economic fundamentals only after these changes
reach critical thresholds.
Kamin and Rogers (1996) examined the currency demand in Mexico prior to the crisis
of 1994. They also found that high monetary base of currency growth prior to the crisis reflected
1  See Levine (1997 for a survey of the literature on financial development and long-run economic growth.
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a “shock” or shift in the demand for money away from broader aggregates toward narrow
money. They also found that the monetary authority did not depart significantly from its
“normal” reaction function in the face of the currency demand shock. They concluded that
effective response to the crisis would have entailed a major departure from the usual stance of
monetary policy measured by the estimated reaction function.
However, Kamin and Rogers analyzed the demand for currency with quarterly data,
using traditional linear error-correction methods. In this paper I use monthly data. Nor did
they examine an explicit demand for quasi-money. Unfortunately, purely linear models, even
those based on cointegration and error-correction, do not perform well with the higher frequency
monthly financial data.
In the next section I examine the data and note several “stylized facts” about the
Indonesian financial sector. I then take up in Section III the linear error-correction model, and
evaluate how it performs, in sample, with the Indonesian monthly data for currency and
quasi-money demand. Then in Section IV, I discuss the neural network model for currency
demand and quasi-money. Section V takes up the out- of sample performance of the linear and
neural network models for currency and quasi money, and shows the crucial role of exchange-
rate uncertainty for predictive accuracy. The last section concludes with a broader policy
discussion of the results.
II.   Indonesian Monetary Aggregates and Asset Prices
Figure 1 pictures the evolution of currency and quasi-money for the past three years.
Figure 1
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One cannot help but notice the jump in currency demand after the start of the financial
crisis in July 1997, and the corresponding fall in quasi-money, The key question : could the
behavior of these monetary aggregates have been anticipated, on the basis of available
macroeconomic data, or did this phenomenon represent a totally unpredictable shock to the
financial sector?
The time paths of the nominal exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate deflated by
the CPI appear in Figure 2. Again, both the variables appear quite calm before the storms of
July 1997.
Figure 2
Figure 3 pictures the behavior of annual rate of inflation as well as the 3 month LIBOR
and the two Indonesian interest rates : the deposit rate and the 30-day SBI rate.
Figure 3
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Figure 3 shows that by early 1997 inflation had fallen to annual levels near 5 percent.
The 30-day SBI rate was approximately equal to the LIBOR rate adjusted for inflation. After
July 1997 both of the Indonesian interest rates rose sharply, as did the rate of inflation.
Figure 4 pictures the evolution of the index of quasi-money to net foreign assets of the
Government of Indonesia since 1989.
Figure 4
Calvo and Mendoza (1996) use this ratio, as well as the corresponding ratio for M2, as
“indices of vulnerability”. The authors point out that it is the instability of this ratio, rather
than the level, that is dangerous[ (Calvo and Mendosa (1996) : p. 243).]. There is a greater risk
that sudden and large shocks to quasi-money would mean a large loss of reserves, and
undermine the currency band or peg.
One sees in Figure 4 the abrupt run up in this ratio between 1994 and 1996 and the
rapid decline in 1997. This ratio has been anything but stable in Indonesia.
Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Juni 20006
III.   Demand for Currency and Quasi-Money :
         Linear Models and Forecasts
A. The demand for currency
The linear model for the demand for currency makes use of monthly data. The results of
the specific model, after elimination of insignificant regressors, appears in Table I.
Linear Error Correction Model of Currency Demand
1984 : 1996
Argument Estimate T-Stat Marg.Sig
[m/py](-1) -0.1370 -3.5143 0.0003
R(-1) -0.1514 -2.6624 0.0043
D[m/p](-1) -0.3778 -6.7428 0.0000
D[m/p](-4) -0.2009 -3.6046 0.0002
D[m/p](-12) 0.2871 4.8981 0.0000
D[y](-5) -0.2647 -5.4294 0.0000
D[R](-3) 0.1851 1.9196 0.0284
Dum (8) -0.0646 -2.4383 0.0080
Idul Fitri 0.0854 2.7256 0.0036
constant 0.7725 10.7305 0.0000
Diagnostics: Estimate Marg. Sig
R-Sq 0.6072
HQ 31.27
DW 1.9892
Q(1)-e^1 0.0450 0.831935
Q(1)-e^2 20.1448 7.18E-06
J-B 1.3354 0.512876
Engle-Ng 12.6065 0.00557
Table 1.
In this equation, lower case m represents the logarithmic value of currency in circulation,
upper case R is the level of the deposit rate, y is the logarithmic of real gdp. D is the first
difference operator, while Dum (8) is the August monthly dummy variable, and Idul Fitri is
the dummy for the date of the Idul Fitri celebration.2
2  Idul Fitri is the celebration at the end of Ramadhan, the annual period of fasting in Indonesia and Islamic
countries. Since the calender date of Ramadhan changes each year, this effect cannot be captured by a
monthly dummy variable.
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The results show that all of the coefficients are significant for the estimation period
1984 through 1996 : 12.
The overall in-sample explanatory power, given by the R-Sq coefficient, is quite good,
at. 60.3  The Durbin-Watson significant, given by D-W, and the Leung-Box Q-statistic, for the
level of the residuals, cannot reject serial independence. However, the same Q-statistic, for the
squared residuals, rejects serial independence, indicating the presence of heteroskedasticity.
The Jarque-Bera statistic, discussed in Bera and Jarque (1980) does not reject normality of the
regression residuals, whereas the Engle-Ng (1993) test rejects symmetry in the residuals.
Overall, the currency demand equation performs well with the in sample pre-crisis data.
B. The demand for quasi-money
The demand for quasi money appears in Table 2.
Linear Demand for Quasi-Money
1985.1 : 1996.12
Argument Estimate T-Stat Marg. Sig
[qm/res](-1) 0.0088 1.7781 0.0388
D[qm](-1) 0.2503 3.0324 0.0014
D[res](-3) 0.0219 1.6642 0.0492
[R-R* -Dep](-12) -0.0003 -2.1815 0.0154
AUGUST 0.0112 2.1570 0.0164
constant 0.0027 0.5313 0.2980
Diagnostics: Estimate Marg.Sig.
R-Sq 0.1510
HQ 111.6472
DW 1.9736
Q(1)-e^1 0.0126 0.9106
Q(1)-e^2 1.7791 0.1823
J-B 29.4577 0.0000
Engle-Ng 3.3735 0.3375
       Table 2
3  The HQ statistic is Hannan_quinn information criterion, used for selecting models. It is given by the
formula, n ln(ssr) + ln(ln(n)) k, where n is the number of observations, k the nunber of regressors, and ssr
is the sum of squared residuals. One should chose a model, among alternative specifications, with the
lowest Hannan-Quinn criterion. I refer back to Hannan-Quinn criterion. I refer back to the Hannan-Quinn
criterion for the linear model after discussing the corresponding statistic for the neural network model.
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The hidden layers simply transform the input variables x by one or more
“squasher functions”. The advantage of the neural network approach over the linear
approach is that estimation involves not only sequential processing of the data, using
inputs x to forecast the output y, but also simultaneous parallel processing, since the
inputs are processes by several “neurons” in the hidden layer.
Input-x
Hidden Layer Output y
y
n1
n2
x1
x2
x3
Feedforward Neural Network
The demand for quasi-money depends upon the logarithm of the ratio of the level of
lagged quasi-money to the level of lagged reserves, since these variables are co-integrated. It
also depends on the first lag of the change in the logarithm of real quasi-money, on the third
lag of the change in the logarithm of real reserves, denominated in domestic currency, on lag
12 of the difference between the domestic interest rate R and the foreign interest rate R* less
the annualized rate of depreciation, on an August dummy, and a constant term.
The overall explanatory power of the demand for quasi money is, as expected, lower
than that of the demand for currency. All of the coefficients, except for the covered interest
parity deviation, are significant, and the regression diagnostics do not reject serial
independence, normality, and symmetry in the regression residuals.
IV.   Neural Network Analysis of Money Demand
A. Design of a neural network
Figure 5, below, pictures the “architecture” of a feedforward neural network, relating
inputs x to an observed output y.
Figure 5
neurons-n
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The neural network approach is an outgrowth of  Weierstrass Theorem, which tells us
that any continuous function g (x,y) may be approximated with greater accuracy by a
polynomial expansion of progressively higher orders. Unfortunately, with polynomial
approximation, the number of parameters grows exponentially with the number of arguments
in the function. A neural network, by contract, delivers the same degree of accuracy with fewer
parameters, or greater accuracy with the same number of parameters.
The mathematical expression for a neural network is given by the following system of
equations:
Equation 1 : FF Network
Nt,i = -----------
1
1 + e -π t , i
yt = γ0 +  γ iNi.iΣ
i *
i = 1
nt,i = bi +  ω ijXt,jΣ
i *
j = 1
In this typical  feedforward  network, there are j* regressors, and i* neurons. Each neuron is
formed by a linear combination of the inputs, with coefficients or weights given by {wij} and
{bi}. The linear combinations are then “squashed” by the logistic or logsigmoid function given
by the second expression in Equation 1. Finally, the squashed neurons are recombined with
weights y to produce forecasts of the output y.
The intuition behind the logsigmoid squasher is that is captures “threshold behavior”
in economic behavior, or reaction of people to news. The logsigmoid squasher  has the following
graphical representation:
Figure 6
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Figure 6 shows that at extremely low or high values of a set of input variables, there is
little reaction. However, as the inputs gradually increase from the low values, or fall from the
high values, people begin to “learn”, to react little by little, to changes in the news or
fundamentals. After a certain threshold point, people will adjust very quickly to changes,
positive or negative, in the fundamentals.
The use of a logsigmoid squasher function necessitates pre-processing or re-scaling of
the data if they take on large values, since the input data will simply trigger output values of
unity beyond certain values. One simple rescaling mechanism is to transform the z = [x y] data
set in the following way :
Equation 2 : Rescaling Mechanism
z*t = ---------------
zt - min(z)
max(z) - min(z)
The use of the logsigmoid function as the specification of the “neurons” in the middle
layer implies “bounded rationality” in economic behavior. When people react to news or
changes in economic fundamentals, they do indeed adjust their behavior, but in the short run,
they react only after the changes reach critical thresholds or trigger points. This behavior is in
contrast to pure rational or linear adaptive behavior by economic agents, and represents a
departure from the pure rational expectations approach to macroeconomics.
The problem with the neural network approach, of course, is that there are no a priori
restrictions to limit the number or neurons. Rationals wxpectations macroeconomics teaches
us quite rightly to beware of modelers bearing too many “free parameters”. If a theory or model
can be adjusted to explain everything, in the end, it explains nothing.
There is also the problems of “over-fitting” : an arbitrarily large neural network may
give a very close fit with in-sample data, but fail miserably, much worse than linear models,
with out of sample data.
The approach I take in this paper is to depart from pure rationality, but only slightly, by
using a neural network with only a few neurons,  three. In this I follow the reasoning of Marcet
and Niccolini : deviations from rational expectations are attractive because they avoid the
strong restrictions placed by these expectations, and because the fit of the model improves
dramatically despite the small deviation from rationality [Nicolini and Marcet (1997) : p. 30].
My hope, like that of Nicolini and Marcet, is to show that this expedition into the “jungle of
Money Demand, Financial Distress, and Exchange Rate Uncertainty in Indonesia 11
irrationality” with neural networks can be a safe and productive experience (Nicolini and
Marcet (1997) : p. 30).
B. Demand for Currency
The neural network estimates for currency demand appear in Table 3.
Demand for Currency: Neural Network Estimates
Inputs to Neurons
Input:
[m/py](-1) r(-1) D[m/p](-1) D[m/p](-4) D[m/p](-12) D[y](-5) D[r](-3) Dum(8) Idul Fitri
Neuron: 1 22.0825 -2.7685 -13.3127 -17.3712 3.1234 -3.6592892 -30.598 3.32366 6.198518
2 -0.4076 -0.7320 -0.8935 -0.5091 0.5106 -0.73967603 0.276258 -0.14023 0.310213
3 24.2379 -3.8291 -14.8276 -19.5943 2.9559 -4.72237327 -33.3342 34.69806 7.248473
Neurons to Output:
1 2 3
2.9338 10.6526 -2.8931
Partial Derivatives Evaluated At Mean:
Input:
[m/py](-1) r(-1) D[m/p](-1) D[m/p](-4) D[m/p](-12) D[y](-5) D[r](-3) Dum(8) Idul Fitri
-5.0916 0.5585 2.6923 3.8341 -0.3700   0.7310 6.8743 -8.6406 -1.3905
Diagnostics: Estimate Marg. Sig
R-Sq 0.7410
HQ 5.1582
DW 2.0719
Q(1)-e^1 0.2561 0.6128
Q(1)-e^2 12.5065 0.0004
J-B 0.3247 0.8502
Engle-Ng 15.1974 0.0017
Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the fit of the model improves dramatically, to a value
of 74 from. 6 in the linear model. The Hannan-Quinn criterion at 5 is much
lower than the corresponding value for the linear model, 15.
The partial derivatives evaluated at the mean  are different from the pure
linear regression coefficients. The diagnostics of the model cannot reject serial
independence in favor of first-order autocorrelation. However there is also
evidence of heteroskedasticity and asymmetry in regression residuals.
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C. Demand for quasi-money
Table 4 gives the neural network estimates for the demand for quasi-money.
Demand for Quasi-Money : Neutral Network Estimates
Inputs to Neurons
Input:
Neuron: [qm/res](-1) D[qm](-1) D[res](-3) [R-R*-Dep](-12) AUGUST
1 -3.3111 45.219 -28.4717 -5.9779 -26.8606
2 -127.8175 105.9160 70.7640 5.7473 -5.4477
3 0.2028 0.9887 -0.5361 -0.3305 0.1656
Neurons to Output:
1 2 3
-0.5674 19.7046 1.4256
Partial Derivatives Evaluated At Mean:
Input:
Neuron: [qm/res](-1) D[qm](-1) D[res](-3) [R-R*-Dep](-12) AUGUST
-0.5674 19.7046 1.4256 -0.1233 -0.0343
Diagnostics: Estimate Marg. Sig
R-Sq 0.3538
HQ 97.9971
DW 1.8994
Q(1)-e^1 0.3674 0.5444
Q(1)-e^2 0.0373 0.8469
J-B 33.9232 0.0000
Engle-Ng 2.1142 0.5490
Table 4.
The results show that the neural network explanatory power dominates
that of the linear model, both by the R2 and the Hannan-Quinn criteria. Table
4 also shows that the partial derivatives are rather close to the linear regressions
coefficients, and that the diagnostics show residuals that are serially independent,
homoskedastic, and symmetric.
The superior performance of the network models, with only three neurons,
relative to the linear specification, shows that there are significant non-linearities
in the demand for currency and the demand for quasi-money.
The most important performance measure of any estimation method, of
course, is its out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. This is the subject of the
following section.
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Table 5.
The currency demand and quasi money out of sample forecasts are for the entire year, 1997.
The RMSQ, or root mean squared error statistic, shows that the network model
outperforms the linear model for both currency demand and quasi money demand. However,
the Diebold-Mariono (1995) statistic shows that the network forecast errors are “significantly
better” than the linear forecast errors, only for the currency demand model, not for the quasi
money demand model.
The out-of-sample forecast errors for the two models appear in Figures 7 and 8,
respectively.
Out-of-Sample Performance of Linear and Network Models
Currency Demand Quasi-Money Demand
Linear Network Linear Network
RMSQ 0.804446674 0.17291846 0.396757727 0.2129442
DM-Stat 16.1323288 4.913696598
Mar.Sig 0 4.46875E-07
V.Out-of-Sample Performance of Linear and Network Models
The basic statistics for the out of sample performance of the two models appear in Table 5.
Figure 7.
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Figure 8.
What is really striking in figures 7 and 8 is that the neural network out-of-sample
forecasts are on the mark, until November and December of 1997, for both currency and quasi
money. By contrast, up until this time, the forecast errors of the linear models are persistently
negative. Thus the linear model systematically over predicts currency and quasi money
demand for most of 1997.
What these forecast errors show is that the neural network does remarkably well for out
of sample data up to ten moths for currency and four months for quasi money. Only in
November and December of 1997 does the network model deteriorate. The currency and quasi-
money forecast errors of November and December of 1997 represent shocks of such magnitude
and change that even the highly non linear network model breaks down.
Clearly, there is a “missing variable”, which began to have strong effects on the demand
for currency and quasi-money in November and December of 1997, but prior to that time, did
not have appreciable effects. One candidate that comes to mind is exchange-rate variability, or
exchange rate risk, proxied by the following time varying GARCH specification.
∆et = α+ε t
ε t = N (0,σ2t)
σ t
2
= δ0+δ tε2t-1+δ2σ2t-1
Equation 3: GARCH Model
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Where e is the logarithm of the spot monthly exchange rate, ε is the shock to the exchange
rate, and σ2 is the conditional variance. Setting the parameters α = δ0 = 0, and δ1 = δ2 = 5, one
can calculate the following time varying adaptive and a priori estimate of exchange rate
uncertainty since 1992. This variable appears in Figure 9.
Figure 9.
This time  varying-exchange-rate variable is relatively flat for most of the estimation
period, but in two periods, in 86-87, and at the end of 97, there are large jumps.
The forecasting power of the network for currency is vastly improved when this
additional variable is added to the list of inputs or regressors. Figure 10 shows the forecast
errors of the original network and augmented network models.4
4 Alternative time-varying proxy variables were also used for exchange rate uncertainly. These variables were based
on lagged squared first differences. Their performance was about as good as the GARCH.
Figure 10
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There is no longer a dramatic drop in the forecasting performance of the network in
November and December. The risk variable makes a major difference.
What about the forecasts of quasi-money? Figure 11 pictures the forecast errors of the
original and augmented models.
Figure 11.
Figure 11 shows that there is still deterioration in November and December, but the
forecast errors are mitigated with the augmented model.
Table 6 presents the summary statistics on the out-of-sample errors of the network and
augmented models.
Table 6.
Out-of-Sample Performance of Linear and Network Models
Currency Demand Quasi-Money Demand
Network Augmented Network Augmented
RMSQ 0.1729 0.0653 0.2179 0.2051
DM-Stat 2.1711 0.4514
Mar.Sig 0.0150 0.3259
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VI. Conclusion
The policy implications of the above analysis are hard to escape. Policies which mitigate
exchange-rate uncertainty may play a crucial role in reversing the flight into currency from
quasi-money, and the ensuing demonetizations of the Indonesian financial sector.
Of course, reducing uncertainty about the exchange rate involves the credibility of the
monetary authority it self toward maintaining a fixed exchange rate or one with a limited
band.
In Latin America, such exchange rate based stabilization plans were common in the
mid-1980. In Argentina and Brazil these plans were known as heterodox shocks, and involved
temporary wage and price controls as well as exchange-rate fixes. However, these plans were
eventually doomed, due to the lack of fiscal discipline by the new democratically elected
governments, which took office after years of military dictatorship in both of these countries.5
In the 90’s, similar exchange rate based stabilization plans were again tried. Argentina
adopted a currency board under Domingo Cavallo, while Brazil adopted a rather tight
exchange-rate intervention band under Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, there was no
thought of wage/price controls. In contrast to the failed exchange rate based stabilization
plans adopted earlier, both economies were considerably more open in the 1990.
While Indonesia is not coming out of an experience of chronic high inflation or near-
hyperinflation, as many Latin American countries were in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, it is
facing the problem of a large dollar debt overhang.
One method that was used by Mexico was the FICORCA Plan, adopted in 1983, and
administered initially by Ernesto Zedillo, the current President of Mexico [Zedillo (1993)].
Such a plan involved the government assuming the dollar obligations of indebted domestic
firms, while the firms in turn negotiated payment in local currency to the central bank. The
program was voluntary, and applied only to the rescheduled foreign debt.
A similar plan, called sucretization, was tried in Ecuador in 1984. In this plan the
government reserved the process of dollarization by assuming domestic dollar debts and
receiving payment in domestic currency, the sucre. This plan had the unexpected payoff of
leading to an increase in the demand for domestic deposits, an appreciation of the domestic
currency in the parallel markets, and a dramatic fall in inflation within one year.6
5 For further analysis of these “incredible reforms”, see Calvo (1986,1989), and Calvo Vegh (193).
6 See McNelis and Nickelsburg (1990) for more about the Ecuador plan and a comparison of dollarization problems
in Peru during this period.
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As of April 1998, the Indonesian government is in the process of formulating a FICORCA-
type plan for corporate debt relief. Such a plan, if well executed with a credible, time-consistent,
and sustainable exchange-rate agreement, may have the happy consequence of initiating a
virtuous cycle of stabilization and remonetization as well as much needed debt relief. FICORCA
may indeed function as Indonesia’s preannounced “currency board ”in disguise.7
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